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IN-PROCESS R&D (IPRD) WRITE-OFF MISCLASSIFICATIONS IN COMPUSTAT: AN 
ECONOMETRIC EVALUATION 
Lolita Pa ll, Penn State Berks 
Over th e period 1994-1999, for a sample of 57 firms, in-process research ami development (IPRD) costs 
write-off5 were reported in the 10-Ks of approximately 12% of the obsen,ations. The IPRD amounts 
ranged fi ·om $230,000 to over $16 7 million. In 38% of these cases, Compustat overstated R&D expense by 
including the IPRD write-off Comparative econometric estimates obtained show larger parameter 
coefficients when the Compustat 's R&D expense data was used. This suggests prior research on R&D tax 
credit eff ectiveness based on Compustat data may have been upwardly biased, overstating the ULl: credit's 
incentive effects. Policy implications and directions for future research are discussed. 
JNTRODUCTION 
Standard and Poor's Compustat database is frequent ly 
used in accou nting, finan ce and economi cs empiri cal 
resea rch. ot surpri singly. a fairl y ex tensive body of 
litera ture in vesti ga tes thi s data source 's inte~rity across 
va ri::~ble anu yea rs. For example, San Miguel (1977) 
co mpares Comp usta t's reported 1972 R&D ex pense 
amounts to firms' I 0-Ks, findin g a di screpancy in 30% o f 
the sa mpl e o f firm s tes ted . Rosenberg and Houglet ( 1974) 
compa re stock prices in Compustat to the Center for 
Re ·earch in Sec urity Pri ces (CRSP) quotations (during 
the 1960s) findin g no materi al e1Tors. Vasarhelyi and 
Y:mg ( 1983 ) examine total assets , eum:nt li ab iliti es. net 
sa les, net income before extraordinary items. in ventories, 
gross pl ant , anu Jep rec i ::~t i on lor 200 firms in 198 1. They 
finu error rates of 0°o, .5°o, l0 o, 3°·o, 4.5%, 6%, and 
34.5°o, respec ti ve ly. B e::~ n and Guerard ( 1989) co mpare 
resea rch cx pend il ures reported in ( 'omp usta t to NSF :md 
Cens us Burea u report s, fi ndin g the Compustat amounts 
tended to be hi gher due to difiCrences in R&D 
defin iti ons. particularl y in I9n and 1979. Kinney and 
Swanson ( 1993) exa mine the accuracy of Compu stat's 
tax-related dat::~ li elds over the penod 19/:;6- 1988. findi ng 
a total error frequency of 11 .65°o. Simi larl y, Man7on 
( 199-l) find s Compusta t incoiTL'C tl y reported Net-
Operat lllg-1 osses (NOLs) as 1.ero or mi ss ing in 3.8% of 
the sample dunng the yea rs 1982- 199 1, when a review o r 
the firm ~' I 0-Ks sugges ted othetw ise. Kern anu Morris 
( 199-l) cons1der the cl'kel database choi ce (( ' om pus t::~t v. 
Value I 111e) ha s on empi riczil researc h. 13aseu on da ta 
from 1 C) 77- J9l) I. th ey fi nd the choi ce of databa se ''can 
a iTect the resu:ts ol' and inl'crenccs drawn from empir ical 
rese::~ re h 111 "ays more than a n t1cip~1led by researchers" 
(p .2S-l) . 
Idea ll y, tax-re lated empirical research should be 
per fonned with tax return data, since tax filin gs provide 
the most reli able infonnation on items such as corporate 
tax li ab ili ties, NOLs, expenses, and tax cred its. However, 
since tax returns are confidential , most empirical research 
on R&D tax incenti ves on the fitm-l cvel has been based 
on a variety of public data sources. (A ltshul er, 1989 is a 
rare c x~.- ept i on.) in the case of R&D tax credit studies, 
da ta ourccs used in clude McG raw-Hill Surveys (Collins, 
1983) ; Na ti onal Sc ience Foundation (NSF) reports 
(Bai ley and Lawrence, 1992), I 0-K filin gs with the 
Securi ti es and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Paff, 2004 
and 2005; McC utchen, 1993) , and Compustat (Swenson, 
1992; Berger, 1993 ; Eisner et al, 1993 ; Hall , 1993; Hines, 
1993; Bi llings and Fri ed, 1999 ; Billings et al. , 200 I). 
The literature eva luating the appropriateness and 
potentia l biases associated with the use of Compustat or 
other public ly ava ilab le data in R&D tax credit related 
resea rch has focused on the differences in definitions 
with respect to what constitutes "research" or 
"deve lopment" (Hall and Long, 1999), the effects of 
::~ ccountin g rec lass ifica tions from non-R&D items to 
R&D expense (Hall and Wosin ka, 1999) , and the 
appropriateness of using R&D ex pense as a proxy for 
qua lifi ed research expenditures for R&D tax credit 
purposes (llall and van Reenen , 2000). Along a related 
theme, Bea n and Guerard ( 1989) compare R&D amounts 
reported in Compu stat aga inst NSF data. Although their 
results obtai ned with Compustat data were not materi all y 
dil'lc rent !'rom those obtain ed from NSF data , they did 
observe signifi ca nt differences for certain industri es 
across certain years. " In general it appea rs that firm s 
over-report R&D ex penditure in Compustat relati ve to 
NSF/Census" (p.205). Simil arl y, I Ia II and Long ( 1999) 
evaluate the consistency and accuracy of R&D data from 
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two sources: firms ' 10-K filings with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the National Science 
Foundation (NSF). They write: 
Substantial effort appears to have gone into getting 
the R&D numbers "right" by the professional 
accounting world, by which we mean following the 
definitions and reporting requirements carefully 
and systematically, both within a sin gle company 
and across companies ... We have concluded, 
therefore, that the best practical course is to use the 
10-K data as a benchmark ... (p.27) 
Interestingly, much less attention has been given to 
the potential for bias and erroneous findings that may 
result if the public data source suffe rs fro m discrepancies 
or errors. Of particular note, Kern and Monis 's (1992 and 
1994) effective tax rate studi es focused on examining and 
reconciling the differences in empiri cal results obtained 
by testing the same theoretica l model with two different 
databases, Compustat and Value-Line. This paper extends 
that vein of research in two ways. First, since we are 
unaware of any studies subsequent to San Miguel' s 
comparison of Compustat v. 1 0-K rep011ing of 1972 
R&D amounts, and given the fairly large number of R&D 
tax credit studies utili zing Compustat data, a more recent 
comparison of Compustat 's R&D expense to the amounts 
reported in firms' 1 0-Ks during the period 1994-1999 is 
provided. Second, this paper provides comparati ve 
empirical results obtained by testing a model of R&D 
investment sensitivi ty to tax price changes with two 
alternate data sources, 10-K filin gs and Compustat, for 
the same sample of finns. In contrast to MorTis and Kem, 
this research focuses on the differences between 
Compustat data and the original source data, each fim1 ' s 
1 0-K filings. 
Of particular relevance is the possibility of encoding 
and classification of errors in Compustat by including 
IPRD amounts in R&D expense . IPRD represents a 
portion of the acquired firn1 's past expenditure for 
research proj ects. Because these amounts do not 
represent current period expenditure for research activity 
they are not pari of qualified resea rch expend iture for 
R&D tax credit calculation purposes. Therefore, these 
amounts should be excluded from research and 
development expense when R&D expense is used as a 
proxy for qualified research expenditure in eva luating the 
effectiveness of R&D tax cred it poli cy or testing mode ls 
ofresearch investm ent. 
The accounting for and reporting of R&D is governed 
by two Financial Accounting Sta ndards Board 
Joumal of Business and Leadership : Resea rch, Practi ce, and Teachin g 
pronouncements, Statements of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SF AS) No. 2, Accounting fo r Research and 
Development Costs ( 1975) and No. 68 , Research and 
Development Arrangements ( 1985). Despite the re lative 
constancy of accounting policy, increases in merger and 
acq uisition activity has complicated the accounting for a 
closely related item, acquisitions of in-process research 
and development (IPRD) . Thi s is beca use SFAS No. 2 
"requires that R&D generally be expensed as incun·ed 
and that each year's tota l R&D be di sclosed in the 
financial statements . . . SFAS 2 could lead to exaggerated 
results in repmiing the acqui si tion of a company with in -
process R&D" (Oli ver 2003 , 46) . To illustrate the impact 
IPRD can have on a firm 's financial statements, 
Sta llworth and Di Gregorio (2005) note that Network 
Assoc iates paid $131 million for CyberMedia in 1998. 
They expensed 93% of the purchase price as IPRD. Upon 
completion of an SEC review, Network Associates 
reversed $214 of the IPRD wri te-off. 
Although publicized examples of large write-offs did 
not occur until the mid-tolate-1990s, corporations ha ve 
been allowed to vvrite off IPRD since the late 1970s. One 
of the earli est and highly public ized cases occuned in 
1990 when Lotus Development Corporation wrote off 
$53 million or over 8 1% of the purchase cost of Samna 
Corporation as in-process R&D. In 1993, C isco Systems 
determined that 80 percent of its $ 120.5 million 
acqui sition of Lightstream Corp. could be ath·ibutable to 
purchased R&D (McGoldr ick, 1997). ''By the end of 
1996, the FASB was reported ly reviewing its rules 
governing R&D write-offs. The SEC was sa id to be 
investigating acquirers' va luations o f purchased research 
and development" (Brow11ing, 1997; 30). As San Miguel 
( 1977) notes : 
Several factors may have contributed to the poor 
quality of R&D data in the 1972 Compustat 
tapes . . . One was probably the newly implemented 
1 O-K R&D di sclosure rules. The new rules 
required that different bits o f R&D information be 
di sc losed in a vari ety of locations ... Unless these 
facts were carefull y ferreted from the 10-K 's 
numerous sta tements, foohlotes, and sched ules, 
errors 111 classi fying the data were apt to result" 
(p.639). 
G iven the compl exity of IPRD acco untin g and the 
reportin g of R&D-related informati on 111 mu ltipk 
financia l statement loca ti ons. suggests Compustat may 
have some eJTors with respect to amounts reported as 
R&D ex pense . lndeed, our results show that in the cases 
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o f reported IPRD, Compusta t en·oneous ly inc luded IPRD 
in R&D and thereby overstated R&D expense, in 38% of 
the observa ti ons. A comparison of the econometr ic 
resul t sugges ts Compustat da ta provide larger estimates 
of fi rms' R&D tax price sens iti vity than those obta ined 
w ith data derived directly from firm ' 1 0-K s. T hese 
find ings suggest the tax pri ce e la ti c ity estimates 
obtained in prior R&D tax credit studi es using Compustat 
data (including Swenson, 1992 ; Berger, 1993; E isner et 
a !, 1993; J !a ll , 1993; Hines, 1993 ; Bi llings and F ri ed, 
1999; Billings et a l. , 200 1 as noted previo us ly) may have 
been upward ly biased . 
T he paper is organ ized as fol lows. Section 1:\vo 
compares the 1 0-K and Co mpusta t data , providing 
summary sta ti sti cs, analys is of differences be tween R&D 
expense report ed across the data sources, and potenti a l 
expbnations for the observed variations in reported 
amounts. Section three provides a descript ion of the 
empirica l model, tax price computat ion methodology, and 
the econometric results from the I 0-K and Compustat 
data sets. T he paper conc ludes w ith di scussion of the 
impl icat ions and limitations of these fi nd ings, and 
sugge lions for improved use of public source data in 
empirica l R&D po li cy research. 
10-K Data vs. COMPUSTAT 
Data Gathe ring and Reporting from Compustat 
and I 0-Ks: Each yea r, publicly owned corporations arc 
required to fi le an annua l report ( 1 0-K) of fina nc ial and 
operat ing information with the SEC. The SEC requires 
fim1s to submit thei r fi lings to the EDGAR system. 
EDGAR, the Electron ic Ga the1i ng A nalys is and Retrieval 
system, " perlom1s automated co ll ection , va lidation , 
indexing, acceptance. and forwardin g of submi s ions by 
companies and others w ho a rc required by law to file 
fon11s wit h the U.S. Securiti es and Exchange 
Commi ss ion (SEC). Its primary purpose is to increase the 
effic iency and fa imess of the securiti es market for the 
benefit of in\'Cstors. corporations, and the econo my by 
accelerating the receipt, acce ptance, di ssemination , and 
ana lys is oft1me sens iti ve corporate informat ion fi led with 
the agency" (\\'W\\'.sec.gov/edgarla bo utedgar. htm). 
Dur ing the yea rs 1994- 1996, the SEC phased in the 
LDG R fi li ng requirement. For nearl y a ll the fi rms in 
this stud y. filin gs prior to 199G are not ava ilal) le in the 
I:DGAR system. l lowevcr, s ince firm s a re required to 
report prior pe ri ods· in fo rmati on for co mparati ve 
purposes. the li lings tha t a re ava ilable usua ll y in clude 
financ ia l uata extending back to 1992, assumin g the firm 
\\as in operal!on . 
Journa l o f Business and Leadership : Research. Prac ti ce, and Teachin g 
T he fi lings w ithin EDGAR are in plai n text fonnat 
and HTML. T his makes for quick on line access, but does 
no t a ll ow for the doW11loading anu saving of fil es in a 
fo m1at that is convenient for analys is . However, given the 
need fo r printab le vers ions of thi s data by researchers 
fi nanc ia l analysts, accountants, and investors, it is no\~ 
poss ible to acquire the SEC fi lings in Rich Text Format 
(RTF) . EDGAR-online provides RTF vers ions of 
EDGAR filin gs . The 10-Ks for a ll the fin11s in the sample 
were down loaded fro m thi s prop1ietary service . The 
filin gs downloaded from E DGAR-online are identical to 
the fi lings w ith the SEC in a ll respects except that they 
have been fo n11atted to RTF. To verify the accuracy of 
the fi li ngs as provided by EDGAR-online, one income 
statement for every tenth firm in the sample was tested . 
T he yea r o f the income statement was rotated in reverse 
chrono logica l order to avo id bi as . There were no 
discrepancies bel:\veen the information in EDGAR and 
the RTF version down loaded from EDGAR-online. 
To veri fy that EDGAR-on line had not omitted 
publi c ly ava ilab le infom1ation from its database, the 
EDGAR r1a tabase was searched for a sample of finns' 
fi ling and compared to the number of filings avail able 
for that firm through Edgar-on line. Agai n, there were no 
cases where EDGAR-on line suppli ed fewer fi lings than 
what was public ly ava il ab le fro m the SEC. Based on 
these find ings, we assume the data from the EDGAR-
online fil es is equi va lent to the data with in the SEC 's 
E DGAR database. 
Some firm s in the sa mple were not publicly OW11ed or 
made the ir initia l pub lic offering (lPO) of stock during 
the study pe riod ( 1994-1999). In these cases, 10-K filings 
may no t be ava il able. However, another va luab le source 
of fi nanc ia l statement data is the S-1 registTation , Section 
II of an S- 1 regis tTat ion , "Genera l form fo r registration 
of sec uriti es under the Sec lllities Act of 1933." In 
paiii c ular, the " In format ion with Respect to the 
Registrant" portion of the S- 1 inc ludes the same financial 
and operational data as a firm ' 1 0-K . Therefore, in cases 
whe re I 0-Ks were not ava ila bl e, the S- 1 registTation was 
used as an a lte rnate source. T he inc lusion of S-1 
rcg istTa ti on data is an exampl e of a d iffere nce between 
us in g firms' fi lings with the SEC and us ing Compustat 
fo r empiri ca l resea rch. Compustat data is limited to the 
I 0-K as the source of its fina nc ia l data . For exampl e, if a 
firm went pub li c in 1997 , C'ompu tat woul d not inc lude 
pri or peri ods' va lues, even if the da ta was reported in the 
firm ' s S-1 reg istrati on . T hus, financia l results fi·om 
peri ods be fore the firm 's stock were publi c ly tTaded are 
no t ava il ab le in Compustat. 
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Another important difference between Compustat data 
and values obtained from SEC fi lings relates to 
restatements of financial statement amounts. Firms are 
required to report multiple periods ' va lues in the fina ncia l 
statements. For example, a fim1 ' s 1996 fi sca l year-end 
statements will include income statements for at least 
1995, but will often include 1994 as we ll. If a significant 
event occurs during 1997, such as the ale of a business 
segment, or an acquisition of another fim1 , the 1997 year-
end statements wi ll segregate the materia l event and for 
comparability purposes, restate the fi nancia l results of 
prior periods . In thi s example, 1996 and 1995 will be 
restated as if the materia l event had occurred during those 
periods. The data in Compustat is intentionally adjusted 
for greater comparabi li ty across periods. However, for 
researchers using financial statement data as a proxy for 
qualified research expenditure in R&D tax credit policy 
evaluation, restated va lues are not appropriate . Therefore, 
for purposes of thi s study, the data derived directly from 
firms' 10-Ks were drawn from the earliest statement 
avai lable first, working fo n vard to the more recent 
filings. This ordering was necessary in order to obtain 
amounts closer to the va lues the fim1s likely used to 
compute R&D tax credits. 
To summarize, Co mpustat' s and 10-K ' s repmied 
research and development expense amounts may di ffer 
for one or more reasons. Compustat may repo11 fewer 
observations since it is limited to 10-K fi lings as a data 
source . The restatement of expense fo r comparative 
financial statement purposes, may affect ana lysis in time 
series analysis or when year-speci fie financia l statement 
amounts are used as a proxy fo r a tax return item. Last, 
accounting and reporting complexity for items such as 
IPRD may result in coding and mi sc lass ification en ors in 
Compustat. 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics: 
Compustat was used to generate a preliminary sample of 
fim1s based on the following screen ing criteri a: 
• Population Particulars: SIC Codes : 2834, 2835, 2836, 
7372, 7373 
• Fundamenta ls : R&D Ex pense > 0 
• Company Specifics : State: Ca liforn ia 
T he sampl e s ize was preliminary because some- of the 
firms selected by the screeni ng process could not be part 
of the study for one or more reasons. First, only firn1s 
with all research activity confin ed to the headquarter-
state are included in the ana lys is. Limiting the samp le to 
single-state R&D perforn1ers resulted in fairl y large 
di fferences between the research intensiti es of the 
16 1 
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included and excluded pharmaceutical . Note that testing 
s ingle-state R&D perforn1ers exclusivel y is not the same 
as limiting the samp le to finns operating entirel y in one 
state. Indeed, over 47% of firms in the sa mple had sale 
and/or manu factu ring offices located in two or more 
states. However, thi s selection criterion may ha ve 
resulted in relative ly young firms being inc luded , and 
older, more established fi m1s bei ng exc luded. Without 
detai led infonnation regard ing the spending by location 
of mu lti-site R&D perfonners, there is no way of 
es timating R&D tax prices those fim1s face. 
Firms with insufficient or incomp lete data were 
excluded. For example, some firms may not have 
public ly repmied financi al infonnation ava ilable in pri or 
year because they were pri vately held. P1ivate ly owned 
fi m1s are not required to make pub lic the ir financial 
statements. ln other instances, a finn may no t have been a 
stand-alone en ti ty for the entire study period. Another 
reason for a finn to be excluded from the study rel ated to 
its yea r of fom1ation . In some cases, finns in operation in 
1994 may ha ve ceased to exist by the end of 1999. In 
other cases, fim1 s operating in 1999 may not have existed 
in 1994 . Therefore, this tudy's outcomes pertain to the 
research behavior of existing and survJvmg 
pharmaceuti ca l and software firms. 
In addition to the research in ten sity differences, 
excluded firm s tended to be more profitable. It is unclear 
how thi s may have affected the results . If economi es of 
sca le or scope exist in the ap pli ca ti on of R&D results, it 
may be argued that larger fim1 s with multiple-state 
research and more pe1i ods in which net income was 
reported stand to ga in more from undertaking R&D and 
from increased research tax credit rates than smaller fim1s 
with consistent losses . Thi s would mea n the results 
obtai ned are s lightl y understated . Since Compustat 
cJrovides compl ete data on publicly owned corporations 
exclusive ly, structural difference in R&D investment 
bet,,·ecn pub lic and pri vate entities are not captured in 
these resul ts. Himmelberg and Petersen ( 1994) find that a 
fa irly large ponion of in vestment can be explained by 
di fferences in internal fina nce. Thi s suggests publicly 
owned companies may ha\'e an ad va ntage in financing 
resea rch in vestment tha n their pr iva tely O\\ned 
countcq)ai1s . A lthough R&D pending fo r public ly 
owned sma ll firm s may be hi gher than for pri vatel y held 
entiti es, it is not clear whether a firm s· ownership status 
affects incremental chan ges in R&D im·estmcnt. Since 
both grou ps should be similarl y mot ivated to reduce 
corporate income tax li ab ili ty. it seems like ly that fim1s in 
both ca tegories would re -pond s imil arly. However, 
beca use public i, owned companies arc infl uenced by 
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investor ownership and public scrutiny, the investment 
patterns observed may re fl ect greater volati li ty than 
Jou mal of Business and Leadership: Research, Practice, and Teaching 
would be observed for private ly owned firms (see 
Bushee, 1998). 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Research & Development Ex pense- 10-K & S-1 Filings 
ALL Software Biotech 94-'96 97-'99 
Mean 3 1,374 34 ,035 29,296 26,706 36,042 
Std .Dev. 10 1,7 10 132,845 68,500 88,8 14 113,22 1 
Minimum 36 36 287 85 36 
Max imum I ,009 ,880 1.009 ,880 47 1.1 00 7 19, 143 I ,009,880 
N 342 150 192 17 1 17 1 
Research & Development Expe nse- Compustat 
ALL So ftware Biotech 94-'96 97-'99 
Mean 30,973 36,385 26 ,745 26 ,6 18 35,329 
Std .Dev. 105,241 14 1,634 63,905 98, 100 112,049 
Minimu m 36 36 287 36 83 
Max imum I ,009,880 I ,009,880 434.092 886, 197 I ,009,880 
n 342 150 192 17 1 17 1 
I PRD Obse rvations- Derived from I 0-K Filings 
ALL Software Biotech 94-'96 97-'99 
Mean 20,8 18 17,495 25.248 19,343 22 ,292 
Std.Dev. 34, 169 35,00 1 33,495 36,836 32, 123 
Minimum 230 255 230 230 992 
Max imu m 167,054 167,054 124,888 167,054 124 ,888 
n 42 24 18 2 1 2 1 
Note : A mo unts are in $ 1 OOOs, except samp le s izes. 
In summary, the firms 111 thi s study can be 
characte1i zed as sing le-sta te R& D perfom1ers, public ly 
own ed pham1aceutica ls and software fim1s that have been 
in operation s ince at least the ea rl y 1990s. It is unclear 
whether any or all of the potenti al biases are present . 
Additiona l research is needed to ga in per pecti ve on 
whether the results obtained are representati ve of all 
firms in these industri es and across other states. 
Table 1 reports the descri pti ve stati sti cs of the net 
sampl e in total and acros various sub-samples across 
both sources of data . T he sample of 342 represents 6 
annual observations ( 1994-1999) for 57 fi rms (25 
software and 32 pham1aceutica ls/biotech). A review of 
the Compusta t and I 0-K research and development 
expense amounts hows a fa ir amoun t of consistency 
between the data sources, pa rti cularl y with respec t the 
observed m inima and max ima. T hi s is true ac ross 
industries as we ll as time peri ods. With respec t to the 
differences across the pharmaceutica l and softwa re 
industri es, the oftware industry has a hi gher mean 
regard less of data source . ln addition, the Compustat 
software R&D is larger and has greater dev iati on. 
refl ec ti ng in pan the large r number of software fim1s that 
reported TPRD wri te-o ffs. 
Interes ting ly, the mean R&D expense from the I 0-K 's 
is hi gher than the Compusta t mean. However, the 
standard deviati on fro m Compustat is greater. Thi s 
suggests that Bean and Guerard 's ( 1989) findin gs from 
the 1980s still ho lds: taken as a who le. Compusta t is 
fair ly cons1::. tent to o ther data sources , but there are 
in stances where material differences occur. The variation 
appears to be attlibutab le to the software firms during the 
yea rs 1994- 1996. This fi nding is consistent wi th software 
firm s becoming more cautious in recording and writing 
down IPRD at the end of the decade in response to 
increased SEC scrutiny (Dowdell and Press, 2002). 
Each IPRD observation refl ects a year in which the 
firm wrote off some or all of its in-process research. 
These observations represent j ust over 12% of the 
sa mpl e. Consistent with the trends reported in the 
financ ial new , IPRD write-offs can involve large sums; 
the sma ll est observati on was $230,000, the largest over 
$ 167 million. Also consistent with a prior expectation is 
the increase in the mean IPRD observed from the earli er 
to the later period . The sli ghtl y larger number of software 
firm IPRD observat ions a lso agrees with Dowdell & 
Press (2002) who observed that over half of all reported 
fin anc ial statement restatements occurred in the 73 7X 
STC (Business Serv ices - Computer Programming and 
Data Process ing ca tegory) and concurTentl y, large 
numbers of fir-ms in the industTy made acqui sitions that 
inc luded IPR.D . 
Theoretical Model and Empirical Results 
Theoretical Model of R&D Investment Based on 
Tax Price Estimates : T he spec ifi cation and underlying 
theoretica l mode l fo ll ow Paff (2004 and 2005) and Hines 
( 199 1 ). The purpose of the model is to test fo r structura l 
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shifts in the coefficients on the tax pri ces of R&D . The 
variables are: 
It- Refers to fim1 i in time period t 
O,J..l - Exponents referring to R&D input and non -R&D 
inputs respectively 
~~_Parameter common to a ll fin11S in period t 
\j/; _Fixed effect for fim1 i 
U;1 _Normally di stributed error tem1 
S(Rc, RH, I) - Fim1 sa les are a function of in-house 
and contract research as well as non-R&D inputs 
Rc _Contract research 
RH _In-house research 
I -Non-R&D investments 
Assuming, as did Hines, that firms ' production follows a 
Cobb-Douglas form: 
S;,(Rc,,, RH;, ,I ;,) = (Rc;,)6 (RH;,)'1 (J;,Y' exp(¢, + '1/; + lt ;, ) 1) 
Separate specifications for each form of R&D require 
observations of each category of expendi ture. However, 
only one variab le, R&D expense, was observed for each 
finn. The single annua l observation was divided into 
contract and in-house segments for the purpose of 
estimating the tax p1ices of each . Since there is only one 
observed independent variab le, the econometric testing 
must be based on a s ingle equation: 
The left side represents the natural log of the annual 
total research expend it-ure observed for each finn . The 
specification ind icates that R&D expenditure is a 
function of time and fi m1 effects and the tax prices of 
both fon11S of R&D . 
Tax Price Computations 
In order to test firms ' re earch investment 
responsiveness to changes in R& D lax price changes 
(PRe and PRH above), estimated tax credits and tax p1ices 
for each firm in each period were prepared . The credit 
rates used come direc tl y from state tax statutes. The 
California credit is pattem ed a fter the federal leg islati on, 
with the purpose of rewarding only the R&D acti vity 
undertaken with the state. U nlike the federal credit, the 
Cali fo rni a credi t is permanent. For in -house R&D 1n 
excess of a thresho ld amount, the tax credit rates are: 
• For tax years beginning pri or to 1 I I /97: 8% 
• For tax yea rs beg inning pri or to 1/ 1/99: II % 
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• For tax years beginning prior to I II /00 : 12% 
• For tax years beginning on or a fter 1/1 /00 : 15% 
For bas ic research payments, ·'contract research," 
above threshold levels, the tax credit rates are: 
• For tax years beginning pri or to 1/1 /97 : 12% 
• For tax yea rs beginning on or after 1/1 /97: 24% 
As Ha ll and Wosinska ( 1999) di scuss, "The Ca li forn ia 
law uses the federal de finiti on o f the base leve ls but with 
the important feature that a lthough the R&D in tens ity 
used to determine the "Base A mount" is the same number 
used in the federal ca lcula ti on, the sa les figure by which 
it is mu ltipli ed is the Ca li fo mi a share of tota l sales. Thi s 
has the strange , but possib ly intended, e ffec t that a fi rm 
with sa les throughout the United States bu t whi ch docs 
a ll of its R&D in Californi a can have a ra ther low base 
leve l of R&D spending rela ti ve to it s current level, year 
a fter yea r, even tho ugh it is not increasing its R&D .. 
The e ffect o f the pro vision is to give firms a strong 
in venti ve to loca te the ir R&D labora tori es in Cali fornia , 
even if the rest of the fim1 is nationwide. It is likel y that 
thi s is one of the goa ls o f the legi s lation" (p .8). 
Several o ther parameters are also necessary fo r 
estimating the tax pri ces. F irst, note that because by 
des ign a ll firms in o ur sample do a ll their research 
activiti es in their home state , we set the in-sta te R&D 
fract ion w,= l .O as well as the U.S . R&D fract ion u ,= l .O 
for a ll Finns. M oreover, we assume no tax credits for 
inputs other than R&D . Another parameter is the 
marg ina l federa l corporate tax ra te, Tred· Thi s va ri es by 
fim1 and by year accord ing to the somewhat complex 
statutory leve ls and the I OK or S- 1 reports by the fi m1 on 
their level of be fo re-tax pro fi ts , as fo llows: 
• I 5% if the year 's profit befo re taxes > 0 & < $50,000 
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• 25% if profi t be fo re taxe :::=: $5 0 ,000 & < $75,000 
• 34% if profi t be fo re taxes :::=: $75,000 & < £ 100 ,000 
• 39% if profi t before taxes :::=: $ 100.000 & < $335,000 
• 34% if profit be fore taxes ::::: $335,000 & < £ 10 
milli on 
• 35% if pro fi t before ta xes.::_ $ 10 mill ion & < $ 15 
milli on 
• 38% if pro fit before taxes > S 15 mi lli on & <. 
$ 18.333 333 milli on 
• 35% otherw ise. 
F inally, the federa l R&D creuit rates (Pc ami PH) we re 
by sta tute 0 .20 fo r a ll stud y peri ods, except 1995 anu 
1996. Congress let the cred it lapse for the one year 
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period between Ju ly 1995- June 1996. Effectively, the 
credit was zero for ha lf of each yea r. But our data is 
an nua l. A lthough not idea l because firms cou ld have 
fro nt or back loaded R&D expenditures, we used an 
average 0. 10 federal credit rate for each of those fu ll 
yea rs. 
For a typ ica l exampl e, one so ftware firm in the sample 
faced the fo ll owing characteristics re lative to contract 
re ea rch in 1999: 
• Sta te R&D credit rate for contract research : Yc = 0.24 
• Federal R&D credit rate for contract research: Pc = 
0.20 
• Federa l corporate tax bracket: Lfcd = 0.35 
• State corporate tax: Lin= 0.0884 
• in -sta te sa les apportionment fract ion: a = 0.9575 
• In -state R&D fraction : We = 1.0 [True for a ll firms in 
sample] 
• US R&D fraction: uc = I. O 
• Average out of s tate tax: Lout = 0.075 
So the e ffec ti ve tax price for contract research (P 'c) 
for thi s fim1 in 1999 is: 
• P'c = [a ( 1 - L,n) + ( I -a)( ! -L0 ,n) - YcWc( l -Lin)-
Pelle]( 1 - Lfed) 
• P'c = [0.9575( 1 - 0.0884) + ( 1 - 0.9575)( I - 0.075) -
0.24(1)(1 -0.0884) - 0 .20( 1)]( 1 - 0 .35) = 
• P'c = $0 .3207 
ln other words, the added cos t to the fim1 of one more 
dollar of R&D spendin g for thi s firm , after tax cred its is 
onl y 32 cents . Thi s renects the combined 24 percent 
contract R&D cred it in Ca lifomia, 20 percent Federa l 
Jouma l of Business and Leadership : Research, Practi ce, and Teaching 
credit, the reductive effect of both the firm's 35 percent 
federa l corporate tax bracket and the 8.84 percent 
Cali fom ia corporate tax rate, and accounts for a bit of out 
of state sales apportionment. 
Note the effect of the change in California's tax laws. 
In 1996 and prior years, the state-level credit rate for 
contract research was only 12 percent, while the 
corporate tax rate was 9.3 percent. If the rates had not 
changed, a fim1 with otherwise similar characteristics 
wou ld have faced an effective price P'c = $0.3893, 
roughly 20 percent higher. 
Empirica l Results 
Table 2 provides the pharmaceutical and software 
results fo r the entire pe1iod obtained from Compustat and 
firms ' I 0-Ks. The Contract (LNPRc) and in-House 
(LNPR11) variab les are the natural logs of the estimated 
tax prices of bas ic research and in-house R&D 
respective ly. Although there are many factors that affect 
a firm 's R&D expenditure choice, the regression suggests 
a fair amount of the va riation in research expenditure for 
the period 1994 through 1999 can be explained by the tax 
prices of R&D . Firms average sa les and historical 
research intensity (R&D to sa les ratio) were the on ly 
stati sti ca ll y s ignificant fi xed effects. Other potential 
ri ght-hand-side variab les were also tested , but were not 
found to have any s ignificant explanatory power. These 
variab les inc luded the net income/ loss position of the 
fi rm each year, SIC-spec i fi e dummy va riables, a year-end 
dummy segrega ti ng the finn s with a December 3 1 
reporting date from finns with a fi scal yea r-end date, an 
initia l public offering (IPO) va riable and the age of the 
firm as o f 1994. 
Table 2: Comparative Regression Results 
l'ha rmacc u ti ca ls So ftware 
10-K Compustrll 10-K Compuswt 
VAHIABLE 
I NI'RC -I. 793 2*** - 1.8095 - 1.6-191 ** -5 . 7840** 
(.5344) (. 1495) (.9529) (2 .6739) 
L I'R II -12 .025-1*** -27.3879* * -0 .9758 25. 7429*** 
(4.4649) ( 12.89 0) (3.30 1-1 ) (7 .6263) 
I 1\ ·NS I· -0 .006 1* * 0 .003 1 0.6241*** 0.598 1* ** 
(.0028) ( 0040) (.0760) (. 1476) 
I NSi\ 11-.S 003 11 *** 0 .0689*** 0 .70 12*** 0 .5329*** 
(0115) (026~) (.0347) (.0425) 
N I 92 I 92 I 50 I 50 
,\dj· R' 0 2620 0 I Jt!O 0 .83 10 0 .5650 
Note: . '**, **,and * represent "gntlic"nce to .00 I . . 05 and . I 0. respec ti ve ly. 
Whttc ';, "dJu, tcd s tandard ctTOrs arc sho wn in parentheses. 
C hanges in the s ize of the coe fficients or significance 
of the tax price variab les provide evidence of structura l 
shifts betvvecn the time per iods . The most compe lling 
ev idence of the e ffec t state- leve l tax credit changes on 
resea rch expenditure is suggested by di fferences between 
the 1994- 1996 and 1997-1 999 re necting finns' sensiti vity 
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to the reduced tax prices of R&D that resulted from 
California ' s increases in research tax credit rates that took 
effect in 1997. The results for the comb ined 1994-1999 
periods serve as a benchmark from which the robustness 
of the model in explaining research expendi ture may be 
evaluated. With respect to the model' s abi lity to explain 
R&D investment, there are dramatic differences in the 
coefficients across industries. Note the d ifferences in 
coefficients obtained from the two sources of data. 
The pharmaceuticals show consistentl y nega ti ve tax 
price coefficients, re fl ecting the inverse relationship 
between firms' investment in R&D and the tax pri ce 
faced . The in-house R&D (LNPRH) variable shows 
consistently more nega tive coefficients, highlighting 
Journa l of 13u; mess and Leadership Researc h, Pracucc. and Teachin g 
these firms' greater sensiti vity to changes in the tax price 
of in-house re earch over basic resea rch. This outcome 
may seem somewhat surpri sing. However, the I 0-K 
di sc losures of many of the pharmaceutica ls included 
subcontractin g relationships with large r, more mature 
pharmaceu ti ca ls. Fim1s hired to perfonn research for 
others are probably less like ly to subcontTact research to 
co lleges and uni versities. If the fim1s are not inves ting in 
basic research , the tax pri ce of research should not have 
s ignificant explanatory power. Hence, the lower basic 
research (LNPRC) coefficient may be more a refl ection 
of the characteristi cs of the pham1aceutica l firm s in the 
sample than the effect the tax price of contract R&D ha 
of finns' research choice. 
Table 3: Comparative Results by Time Period- Pharmaceuticals 
199~-1 996 
Pha rmace uti ca ls 
1997-1999 
Pharmaceuticals 
VARIABLE 10-K Compusuu 10-K Compustnt 
LNP RC 2 8072 -2 0500 - 1 7642*** -1.5086** 
(34844) (7.9349) (.695-l ) (.7602) 
LNPRH -148 .8600*** -166.3730*** -30 .8675*** -3 1. 7852** 
(28 . 7007) 6.J 6168 ( 12.4532) (16.06 18) 
INTENSE -0.002-l 0 .0075 -0 .0072** -0 0012* 
(.0035) (.006 1) (.0032) (.02-l I) 
LNSALES 0 .0553*** 0 .0837 ** 0 .0362** 0 .0-109* 
(.0149) (.0393) (.0177) (02-11) 
N 96 96 96 96 
Adj- R1 OJ960 0 .1260 0.28~0 0.2430 
No te· ***, **.and * represen t s1gndi cancc to .00 I, .05 and . I 0, respecuvel) 
White' s adjusted s tandard en·ors are sh0\\11 m parentheses. 
The software in-house results are start li ng. Un li ke the 
pharmaceutical s, the R&D in tensity and sales vari ables 
are consistently sign ificant and larger for the software 
firms. This most like ly re fl ects the inherent research 
investment differences between the two industri es. Many 
of the pharmaceutical s' 10-Ks indi cated they are 
categorized as development stage compan ies; firms that 
have never had product sa les . The software fim1 
typically had multiple products and maintenance conb·act 
revenues. Thus, research intensity mea urcd in tenns of a 
ra tio to sa les and the logar ithm of ave rage sales have a 
greater relationship to software firm s' R&D ex penditure 
choi ce than the pharmaceuti ca ls in thi s study. Of grea ter 
interes t is the Compusra t s ign ifi cance and positive sign 
on the tax pri ce of in-house research. A positi ve sign 
seems t indicate a pos iti ve relationship between in-
house R&D's tax price and fim1 investment . Thi s seems 
unlikely . 
Table 4: Comparative Results by Time Period- Software 
1 99~- 1 996 1997- 1999 
So ftware Soft"arr 
VA RI A BL E 10-J..: Compustar 10-A' Compll.\fnl 
I NPRC .j 786-l "** 81383*** -l 786-l*** 8.13X3**,.. 
(I 053 I) (I 13-16) ( 1 053 I) (I I J-161 
I NPRJI 9 'l9R5* -0.7'>77 9 9985* -0 7.1T 
(5 6059) (9. -1 517) (5 6059) (9 -1517 ) 
INT FNS I: 9.5 (191-i 38.3679*' . 9.5698 38 3679'** 
(8 3013) ( 12 2005) (8301 J) ( 12 2005) 
I NS f\LI::S 0 6~~5*** 0.618~*;#. () 62~5*** 061~X*** 
( 107.1) (.2 -1 35 ) ( 1073) ( 2-135) 
N 75 7 5 75 75 
AdJ- R' 0 769 0 -1 9 () 769 ()-J<) 
Note · ***.*'. 1nd • represent Slgllllicance to .001. 05 and I 0. rc>pccll\ ely 
Wh1te's adju, tcd olandard en·or> arc >hO\In m parcn thcsc> . 
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In order to better understand the unexpected s ign of 
the Compus tat software firm s' in-hou se research 
coe ffi c ient, anal ys is across the two time periods needed. 
Tables 3 and 4 above report the comparative data source 
results aero each time period for the pharmaceuti ca l and 
software firm s, respec tivel y . The Compustat- and 10-K-
based results for the phannaceutica ls a re quite s imilar. 
The primary diffe rence is from differences in the level of 
the coefficients . The tax ptices, if s ignificant, are 
cons istentl y negative for the results ba sed on both data 
ources. However, the coeffi c ients fTom the Compustat 
sa mple tend to be la rger. T hi s is probabl y clue to 
Compustat 's inclus ion of in-process R&D (IPRD) 
amorti zation as part o f R&D expense. 
Larger expense values u ed in the analys is wo uld tend 
to bi as the e ffec t of an R&D credit upward. A likely 
explanat ion may reflect the limited amo unt of resources 
devoted by these fim1s towa rd bas ic research investment. 
Another expl ana ti on m::ty be related to the inherent 
d tfficu lties in appropria te ly labe lin g so ft wa re R&D 
through the th rcc-s t::tgc process required by the PASB. 
The in vestment c ho ices of researc h managers may 
ultimate ly have litt le corre lation to the a mounts repotied 
in the finan cia l statements as resea rch and deve lopment 
expense . More troubling fro m an empiri ca l sense is the 
po ibility tha t these a ·counting va lues may a lso bear 
littl e resembl ance to the :1mounts the fim1s report as 
qua lified research expendi ture when app ly ing for R&D 
tax credit . Thus, the usc of public dat::t for resea rch on 
the softwa re industry·s scns tti vity to c hanges in research 
tax prices may be inappropriate. 
Furthe r analys is of the I 0-K and Co mpusta t results 
revea Is other impot1ant differences. There are 
inconsistenc ies in the parameter shift s from the ea rl y to 
later period , differences 111 s igns, and di f"!C renccs in the 
leve ls of the codlicients. "I hesc result s ha ve severa l 
possible explanations. It may be that the model cannot 
detect the re la tionship be tween tax price and R&D choi ce 
for so ftware firm s beca use the tax pn ces were not that 
important to these firms in the 1990s . "Just to stay 
competiti ve, software deve lope rs h a\'\~ h::td to in ves t 
heav ily in R&D at a pace tha t even e.\eeeds their overa ll 
business growth panem s .. . !\ pos it ive aspec t o f the rap id 
growth ha s been the lack of concem over any loss in 
gove rn ment resea rc h fundin g due to federa l budge t cuts" 
(Researc h and J)e,·e lo pme nt . 1996: 4A) . Thus, indu stry-
specific factors such as the dot-com phenomenon may 
have been more influcnll::t l 111 spurrin g the R& D dec is ions 
of softwa re firm s th :J n c hanges in R&D wx credit po li cy. 
/\ lterna tcly, de te rmintn g R& D ex pense prec ise ly is 
more complex fo r software firm s, thus introducing noi se 
Journa l o f Business and Leadership : Research, Practice, and Teaching 
in the estimation. In particular, SFAS No. 86 Accounting 
for the Costs of Computer Software to be Sold, Leased or 
Othenvi se Marketed ( 1985) requires fillll s to follow a 
tlu·ee stage categori zation of research costs re lated to 
software R&D. For example, software R&D costs 
incun·ed prior to product feasibility being establi shed 
should be expensed. During software production, all 
re levant co ts should be capitalized (reported as an asset 
on the balance sheet) . Once the product is available to 
c ustomers, amortization of the capitalized costs should 
begin. Detetmining when a product has progressed from 
stage one, where costs are expensed, to stage two where 
costs are capita li zed is difficult and subjective. Thus, the 
amo unts reported as research and development expense 
in finns' I 0-Ks may not necessarily reflect the actual 
researc h ex penditure of firms . Additionally, Compustat 
may inaccurately code or c lassify the capita li zed and 
ex pensed portions of R&D. Further complicating the 
issue a rc the difference in definitions utili zed by the [RS 
and Genera ll y Accepted Accountin g Principles (GAAP). 
Qua lified research ex penditure, as spec ified by lntemal 
Revenue Code l74, is not de fined the same as research 
expense in S AS No. 2. For example, SFAS No. 2 
excludes legal fees re lated to patent applications, but IRC 
174 inc ludes them (O li ver, 2003) . 
The in cons istencies in the so ftware resu lts are 
somewhat troubling beca use we cannot c learl y detennine 
if the incons istencies arc due to Co mpustat data gathering 
and reporting issues or troub les assoc iated w ith u ing 
fin ancial statement va lues 1n general to estimate 
confident ia l tax return information , or more generall y to 
diffi culti es 111 accou ntin g for software R&D. 
Additional ly, anal ys is based on subsequent time periods 
wo uld hi gh lig ht whether subsequent changes tn 
accounting and reporting req uirements regarding mergers 
and acq ui s ition s, inc luding treatment of intangibl e assets 
and in-process research show persi stent differences 
between Compustat and I 0-K data . 
CONCLUSIO N 
Despite the un certainties with respect to the software 
result s. the rq,rrcss ion result are consistent with pri or 
fed cra l-Je,·e l studi es that show R&D tax credit e ffec ts 
va ry Jc ross industri es (Man sfie ld 1986; Berge r 1993; 
Mamuneas and Nadi ri 1996) . There arc dramatic 
di ffcrcnccs in the R&D spending, sa les and tax price 
coe ffi c ient estima tes obt:Jincd for the softwa re and 
pharmaceu ti ca l firms in thi s study. Of particu lar note arc 
the implica tions these results have for other studies b:1sed 
on Compus tat data. Because Compustat frequent ly 
inc luded the amorti za ti o n of IPRD in the va lue of R&D 
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reported, R&D expense was often overstated. This means 
the tax price sensitivi ty estimates obtained from 
Compustat data may be biased upward. The ta x pri ce 
coefficients were consistently hi gher when the Compustat 
data was used than when the 10-K va lues were tested. For 
policymakers, this means that bigger changes in R&D tax 
credit rates may be needed for state po l icy setters to 
achieve a target amount of R&D expenditure change. 
Although there may be sampl e se lection effec ts 
associated with analys is limited to single-state R&D 
producing firms, we cannot predi ct with ce rta in ty the 
direction of those effects. Some may suggest that a study 
based on single-state, small R&D intens ive firms may 
overstate the California ' s resea rch ta x cred it policy 
effectiveness . However, larger, more profitable firm s 
with multiple-state R&D may stand to benefit even more 
from a state-level incentive than the firms included in th is 
paper. If the location of research act ivity is a stTategic 
decision, then fim1s with multiple-state operation s may 
react by reallocating the same aggregate spending to 
those locations with the lowest tax pri ce in order to 
benefit from the increased credit rate. G iven the 
incremental nature of the credit. in order for firms to 
benefit from higher rates of credit , their research intensity 
must increase over time. Thus, for multi-state R&D 
performers, the appearance of increased R& D intensity 
for state credit calculat ion purposes can be achieved by 
merely shifting the location of current leve ls of acti vity . 
In contrast, the s ingle-state R&D perfom1ing firms ca n 
only continue to rece ive the cred it by ac tuall y increasin g 
research spending re lative to the ir sa les. Based on the 
available data , there is no way of know ing whi ch group 
of firms responds to a greater degree to changes in state-
level policy. 
These findings are important to state- and Cederal-
level R&D policymakers for severa l reasons. F irst, po li cy 
makers should consider the d ifferences across industri es 
when crafting research policy on the federal or sta te 
leve ls. The software and pharmaceutical firm s exhibited 
vari ation in R&D in vestmen t behavior, and we re 
divergent in their sensitivity to state- leve l R& D tax 
cred its . A common po licy concem fo cuses on the 
poss ibility the public sector is fi nanc in g research activ ity 
that would have occuned even in the absence of the 
incentive. In thi s rega rd, the pos itive so ftware tax pri ce 
coeffici ent is partic ul arl y tToub ling. The noti on o r 
software firn1 s exhibi ting a pos iti ve re lati onship between 
the tax price of R&D and research in,·es tment suggests 
these firms may have been rewa rded for R&D that wou ld 
have been undertaken even i r the c redit \\'ere not 
available . At best, the incen ti ve e ffec ts or stale le\C I 
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research tax credits are modest with the results dependent 
on the data source used. 
Th is paper provides further ev idence of the limitat ions 
and care that must be employed in eva luating research 
results obta ined with Compustat 's R&D data. Future 
research should consider altem ate time periods and firms 
in other industri es in order to shed li ght on the robustness 
o[ the results herein . Idea lly, evaluation o f R&D ta x 
credit po li cy should be perforn1ed us ing tax return data. 
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